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The Senate: Out of Order? 
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL 
Due to the routine use of the filibuster and related devices, today’s 
Senate operates as a supermajoritarian body.  This Symposium Article 
considers whether this supermajoritarian aspect of the Senate renders it 
dysfunctional and, if so, what can be done about it.  I contend that the 
Senate is indeed broken.  Its current supermajoritarian features have 
pernicious effects.  Further, and contrary to the claims of many of the 
Senate’s defenders, this aspect of the Senate is not part of the original 
design.  I go on to explain why the Senate’s procedures, despite their 
deficiencies, have nonetheless proven resistant to reform.  The impediment 
to change is not based in law but instead derives largely from legislators’ 
incentives.  I close by discussing whether and how those incentives could 
be altered. 
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The Senate: Out of Order? 
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The subject of the Connecticut Law Review’s 2010 Symposium is 
whether our constitutional system is broken.  My contribution to the 
Symposium concerns whether the Senate in particular is broken and, if so, 
whether it can be fixed.  Needless to say, that is a large and complicated 
topic, so I will focus on just a few aspects of it.  In particular, I will focus 
on the filibuster, the parliamentary device that lets a minority of the Senate 
prevent action on items the Senate majority would like to enact.  As I will 
explain, filibusters have become a routine part of the legislative process, 
such that the Senate has become, practically speaking, a supermajoritarian 
institution.   
The discussion proceeds in two parts.  Part II assesses the Senate’s 
current condition from two different perspectives, one essentially 
originalist and the other more pragmatic.  I contend that the Senate is not 
functioning well according to either standard.  Part III then considers some 
factors, mostly political, that tend to make the Senate resistant to 
substantial reform.  I conclude with a brief discussion of ways to improve 
the prospects for future reform. 
II.  EVALUATING THE SUPERMAJORITARIAN SENATE  
A.  The State of the Senate 
I begin with some facts about the contemporary Senate, with particular 
emphasis on the recently concluded 111th Congress, which ran from 
January 2009 to January 2011.    
Our system of government is not designed to ease the path of 
legislation.  We have not just a bicameral legislature—both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate have to pass the same bill—but the 
President has to assent as well, giving us effectively a tricameral legislative 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center.  This is an expanded version of my 
remarks from the Connecticut Law Review’s October 2010 Symposium on the topic “Is Our 
Constitutional Order Broken?”  I thank the editors for inviting me to participate in the Symposium.  I 
thank Josh Chafetz, Michael Teter, and Seth Barrett Tillman for helpful comments on a prior draft.  
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process.1  Even so, the 111th Congress opened with the stars aligned for 
dramatic action, with the Democrats in control (or at least seemingly in 
control) of all three bodies.  Barack Obama had just won the presidential 
election convincingly.  The Democrats had a significant majority in the 
House, and their margin in the Senate was larger than we have seen in 
recent times.2  The Democrats did not, however, have sixty votes in the 
Senate when the Congress opened, and they would have that magic number 
for less than half of the two-year congressional term.3  The sixty-vote 
threshold is important, of course, because that is the number Senate Rule 
XXII ordinarily requires in order to invoke “cloture”—that is, to end 
debate and bring a measure to a vote.4  In the contemporary Senate, having 
sixty votes makes the difference between being in the majority and being 
in control. 
The lack of a large enough majority in the Senate proved critical.  
Hundreds of bills were passed by the House but then languished or failed 
in the Senate.5  Some of these bills made the headlines.  Prominent recent 
examples include legislation requiring greater disclosure of election 
expenditures (a reaction to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission decision6) and the immigration-related DREAM 
Act.7  Also widely noted have been a few stalled or failed nominations.8  
Most of the bills and nominations that floundered or foundered in the 
Senate, however, were not nearly as high profile.  Indeed, many of them 
were not even particularly controversial, which in some ways makes the 
difficulty in securing approval all the more remarkable.  In one notable 
episode, a Senator held up dozens of presidential appointments not because 
                                                                                                                          
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (setting forth the constitutional requirements of bicameral 
passage and presentment to the President).  The President’s veto can of course be overridden, but only 
by an extraordinary two-thirds vote of each chamber.  Id. 
2 See Perry Bacon, Jr., Democrats Win 18 More House Seats, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2008, at A41 
(noting that Democrats’ election gains gave them the largest House majority in over a decade); Paul 
Kane, For 111th Congress, Somber Topics Eclipse Ceremony, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2009, at A05 
(noting the unusually large Democratic majorities in both chambers). 
3 See Carl Hulse & Jeff Zeleny, Death of Byrd Weakens Democrats’ Frail Majority, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2010, at A21 (noting that Democrats gained a sixty-vote supermajority with the seating of Sen. 
Al Franken in July 2009 and lost it with the election of Sen. Scott Brown in January 2010). 
4 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, at 15–16 (2007) (Rule XXII.2).  
More precisely, the rule specifies a three-fifths vote of those duly chosen and sworn, which is often but 
not always sixty.  Id. 
5 George Packer, The Empty Chamber: Just How Broken Is the Senate?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 
2010, at 38, 47; see also 372 Bills That Have Been Passed by the House and Not Yet Acted upon by the 
Senate (As of 8/23/10), THE HILL, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/83057-290-bills (listing bills). 
6 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Dan Eggen, Bill on Political Ad Disclosures Falls Short in 
Senate, WASH. POST, July 28, 2010, at A3 (discussing how “Democrats fell just shy of the 60 notes 
needed to avoid a GOP filibuster”). 
7 Lisa Mascaro & James Oliphant, DREAM Act Was Key to Bigger Plan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2010, at A27. 
8 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Long After Nomination, an Obama Choice Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2010, at A16 (reporting on the failed nomination of Dawn Johnsen to lead the Office of Legal 
Counsel). 
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of any objection to the particular nominees but because of a disagreement 
over two administration decisions affecting federal spending in his state.9  
(A single Senator cannot defeat a motion for cloture, but he or she can 
delay action through a device known as a hold.  A hold is essentially a 
threat to filibuster, which would eat up valuable legislative time while the 
majority goes through the process for invoking cloture.10) 
Now, I recognize that a claim that the Senate has gridlocked the 
political system might seem strange, in light of the fact that the 111th 
Congress saw the passage of one initiative of potentially historic 
proportions—the healthcare reform law11—and a few other very important 
statutes, notably including the early 2009 stimulus package12 and the more 
recent financial reform law,13 not to mention the confirmation of Supreme 
Court Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor.  This was not a “do 
nothing” Congress. 
Yet even when it came to the measures that passed, the 
supermajoritarian Senate still took its toll.14  The bills just mentioned 
barely survived despite the Democrats’ numerical strength, and they did so 
only in a highly compromised (some might say disfigured) form that was 
practically dictated by the Senate alone, with the House having little choice 
but to accept whatever the Senate would give it.15  The healthcare law was 
profoundly influenced by the need to secure sixty votes.16  The stimulus 
bill took the shape it did based largely on the need to satisfy Susan Collins, 
                                                                                                                          
9 See Kate Phillips & Jeff Zeleny, Roadblock in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A11 
(describing holds placed by Republican Sen. Richard Shelby); see also John Broder, A Nominee Held 
Hostage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A19 (discussing Democratic Sen. Mary Landrieu’s hold on a 
presidential nominee as a protest over the administration’s moratorium on oil drilling). 
10 The Senate cannot vote to invoke cloture until two calendar days after a cloture petition is filed, 
and another thirty hours of debate are permitted even after cloture is successfully invoked.  STANDING 
RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 4, at 15 (Rule XXII.2).  Thus even a single Senator has substantial 
leverage. 
11 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029.  
12 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  
13 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010). 
14 Sometimes particular Senators exact a toll quite literally in the sense that they require special 
deals in order to win their support.  See infra text accompanying note 43.  
15 See Joseph J. Schatz, House Stymied by Senate Rules, CQ WKLY., Apr. 19, 2010, at 960, 
available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport111-000003643079& 
type=hitlist&num=0& (reporting that the rise of the filibuster and sixty-vote threshold has strengthened 
the Senate’s hand in negotiations with the House). 
16 See, e.g., Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, Prospects for Public Option Dim in Senate, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2009, at A1 (quoting Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) as follows: “No one has been 
able to show me how we can count up to 60 votes with a public option . . . .  I want a bill that can 
become law.”).  It is difficult to say whether the healthcare reform law would have included a public 
option if not for the filibuster.  Such assessments are almost impossible to make with confidence 
because the need to secure sixty votes shapes the bill and legislators’ behavior at every step.  Moreover, 
Senators can act strategically in their public comments regarding how they will vote. 
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a minority-party Senator from the lovely but sparsely populated state of 
Maine.17  What made her crucial was her ability to deliver the pivotal 
sixtieth vote.18 
In sum, although our legislative process features several points at 
which a bill can fail, it is fair to say that the most important of these during 
the 111th Congress was the Senate.  To be sure, there is some contingency 
involved here, such that the Senate will not always be the critical actor.  In 
particular, the magnitude of the obstacle posed by various entities depends 
on the partisan alignment of the branches.  In the 112th Congress, in which 
Republicans control the House of Representatives, the Senate should be 
less critical as a veto point because the other players are already divided.  
Nonetheless, the powerful Senate of the 111th Congress was not especially 
unusual, for the Senate—with its ever more automatic sixty-vote 
requirement—has increasingly become the highest hurdle that legislation 
must clear.19 
B.  Is the Senate Broken? 
So that is the situation.  Now for the diagnosis.  That is, is the Senate 
broken?  Or is everything working as it should? 
There are a number of ways in which the Senate might conceivably be 
broken.  Two of these we can lay aside at the outset without extended 
discussion.  The first possible dysfunction is simply that the Senate is part 
of a bicameral rather than unicameral legislature.20  The second is that 
every state has equal representation in the Senate.21   
I will ignore those features of the Senate, but not because they are 
unimportant or uncontroversial.  Although bicameralism has much to 
recommend it and has been widely though not universally adopted, it has 
its drawbacks as well.22  And the Senate’s malapportionment with regard to 
                                                                                                                          
17 See Greg Hitt, GOP Wields More Influence Over the Stimulus Bill, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, 
at A3; Carl Hulse, No Ordinary Republicans: Maine Senators Break with Party on Fiscal Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A20; Paul Kane, Key GOP Senator in Stimulus Deal Is Known for Centrist 
Approach, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2009, at A08. 
18 More precisely, there were three moderate Republicans whom the Obama administration was 
courting—Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe, and Arlen Specter (before his party switch)—and Collins 
took the lead as the negotiator for this pivotal group.  See Kane, supra note 17, at A08 (describing 
Collins as “the focus of White House attention” and a “central player”). 
19 See Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 1, 17–18 
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009) (showing that the number of bills 
passed by the House but not the Senate has increased in several recent Congresses and linking this 
development to the filibuster). 
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7. 
21 Id. § 3, cl. 1. 
22 The merit of bicameralism is, unsurprisingly, the subject of a large literature.  For rather 
different approaches to the question, with citations to further work, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 29–38 (2006); and Abhinay Muthoo & Kenneth A. Shepsle, The 
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population—which makes citizens of Wyoming seventy times more 
influential than citizens of California23—is both highly consequential and 
quite hard to justify today.24  The reason I ignore these features is that I 
regard them as givens, items that are not likely to be altered.  They are not 
just provided for in the Constitution, which is extremely difficult to amend, 
but the Constitution goes even further by purporting to entrench the 
Senate’s basic structure against amendment.25  Moreover, even without any 
actual legal impediment to such changes, it is hard to imagine the political 
circumstances in which the states that benefit from the Senate and its 
apportionment could be persuaded, or forced, to abandon it.   
Having set aside bicameralism and equal representation, I will instead 
discuss the supermajoritarian character of the Senate, which is relatively 
more up for grabs both legally and practically.  Thus reframed and 
narrowed, the question for discussion is whether the Senate’s 
supermajoritarian character renders it defective.  In referring to the 
Senate’s supermajoritarian character, I mean primarily the filibuster as 
practiced today—that is, the virtually automatic rule that every measure 
that can be filibustered has to achieve sixty votes to pass.26  Also relevant 
are related practices like holds, which are essentially threats to filibuster.27   
It seems to me that we can approach the question in at least two ways, 
one (broadly speaking) originalist and the other pragmatic. 
1.  Evaluation from Originalist Premises 
By an originalist evaluation, I mean to ask whether the Senate is 
functioning as it was intended or contemplated to operate.  One has to be 
careful in making such inquiries, of course, as they naturally involve a 
number of difficulties—contemplated by whom, how do we know, etc.  
                                                                                                                          
Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 249 (Elhanan 
Helpman ed., 2008). 
23 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK: 2010, at 3 tbl.A-1 
(7th ed. 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/10smadb/2010smadb.pdf (listing 
California’s 2008 population at almost 37,000,000 and Wyoming’s at about 500,000). 
24 See FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 10–11, 189–94, 223–30 (1999) (providing an in-depth 
examination of how the Senate’s structure advantages small states); LEVINSON, supra note 22, at 49–62 
(condemning the Senate’s malapportionment); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566, 568, 576 
(1964) (requiring that state legislative districts be apportioned on a one-person, one-vote basis). 
25 See U.S. CONST. art. V (barring amendments that would deprive a state of its equal 
representation in the Senate without its consent).  The literal text of this provision forbids only changes 
to the Senate’s apportionment.  One could posit a number of creative ways of circumventing the 
restriction, such as by sidelining the Senate altogether.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 292–95 (2005).  Beyond that, one could question whether Article V has 
to be regarded as the sole method of amending the Constitution.  See id. at 295–99. 
26 There are certain categories of legislation, notably including some trade agreements and aspects 
of the federal budget, that are not subject to filibuster.  See, e.g., SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. 
SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 185–94 (1997) (listing 
a number of examples).  
27 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
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Nonetheless, in this case it is possible to provide an answer that is quite 
strong as these things go.  That answer is no: the Senate is not functioning 
the way it was meant to work.   
Now, it is true—and yet also a source of great confusion and 
misunderstanding—that the Senate was meant to be, among other things, a 
check on the House and a break on overhasty or hyperactive lawmaking.28  
Defenders of the status quo constantly invoke this aspect of the Senate’s 
design.  Frequently they recount the story in which George Washington is 
supposed to have compared the Senate to a cooling saucer.29  Though 
probably apocryphal,30 the story is close enough to the mark that it seems 
like it could be true.  Yet the notion that the Framers intended the Senate to 
fulfill its checking function by itself being supermajoritarian is fiction: the 
desired security against imprudent impulse, Madison tells us, would come 
from a lawmaking process that required the assent of multiple, 
independently selected and constituted majorities in the House and Senate, 
not supermajority voting rules within the chambers.31  The Framers were 
mostly hostile to minority vetoes in the everyday lawmaking process; 
supermajority requirements, Hamilton reminds us, had been one of the 
failings of the Articles of Confederation.32  The Framers certainly 
understood that supermajority voting rules have some virtues when it 
comes to blocking unwise laws, but they also understood the serious 
countervailing disadvantages of minority rule.33  As Madison put it, 
                                                                                                                          
28 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (probably James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(defending the Senate in part because it will restrain “the facility and excess of law-making [that] seem 
to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 218–19 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS] (reporting that 
Madison and Randolph favored long senatorial terms to promote stability and bolster the Senate’s 
ability to resist the House); id. at 512 (reporting Morris’s statement that the purpose of the Senate is to 
“check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses” of the House). 
29 E.g., Brian Darling, Bid To ‘Reform’ Filibuster Is Dangerous, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at 
A2; Dispute in the Senate: Excerpts from Remarks on Filibusters, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at A25 
(quoting Sen. Harry Reid, who was minority leader at the time); Why We Need the Filibuster, CHI. 
TRIB., May 27, 2003, at C18. 
30 See Senatorial Saucer, MONTICELLO.ORG, http://www.monticello.org:8081/site/research-and-
collections/senatorial-saucer (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (pointing out that “no evidence has surfaced” 
that Washington actually remarked on the similarity of the Senate to a saucer).  
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 28, at 378 (probably James Madison) (stating that “[an] 
additional impediment . . . against improper acts of legislation” is that “[n]o law or resolution can now 
be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the 
States” (emphasis added)). 
32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 28, at 147–48 (Alexander Hamilton).  When the 
Convention rejected a proposal to require a two-thirds supermajority for Congress to regulate 
navigation, some of the delegates cited the unhappy experience under the Articles of Confederation as 
evidence against such a rule.  2 RECORDS, supra note 28, at 449–53. 
33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 28, at 361 (James Madison) (“That some advantages 
might have resulted from such a precaution [i.e., supermajority voting] cannot be denied.  It might have 
been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and 
partial measures.  But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite 
scale.”).  
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majority voting is “the fundamental principle of free government.”34  John 
Locke would have agreed.35 
The Senate’s early history does not support supermajority rule either.  
A great deal has been written on this topic (a bit of it by me in prior 
work),36 but for present purposes this summary from two of the leading 
scholars of the filibuster will suffice:  “[In the Senate’s first decades], 
[S]enators seemed to assume that final votes—even on contentious 
legislation—would be taken as a matter of course . . . .  Furthermore, 
Senators assumed that approval of legislation would require no more than a 
simple majority vote.”37  In other words, the “sixty-vote Senate”38 is not of 
ancient origin.  
I have been claiming that the Senate is broken according to originalist 
premises in the sense that it is not functioning as intended.  If that is 
correct, that would count as one reason in favor of reform.  It would 
require somewhat more to show that the Senate’s current practices, 
particularly the routine filibuster, are so inconsistent with the original 
understanding as to be actually unconstitutional.  Nonetheless, although 
demonstrating unconstitutionality is not necessary in order to establish 
dysfunction and argue for reform, the filibuster as now practiced is 
probably unconstitutional.  At a bare minimum, the Constitution certainly 
assumes that the Senate would operate under majority rule.  Such is 
evident from the provision allowing the Vice President to break a tie.39  
Similarly, the fact that presidential vetoes can be overridden only by a two-
thirds vote40 shows that something less was anticipated for initial passage.  
Moreover, the Constitution itself specifies supermajority rule for several 
particularly momentous actions such as advancing a constitutional 
amendment, expelling a member, convicting on impeachment charges, and 
ratifying a treaty.41  Add the Framers’ hostility to minority vetoes and this 
is probably enough to push majority rule within a legislative chamber over 
the line from constitutional expectation to constitutional requirement.42 
                                                                                                                          
34 Id. 
35 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) (“[T]he act of the majority [of an assembly] passes for the act of the 
whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.”).  
36 See, e.g., BINDER & SMITH, supra note 26, at 29–51; GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 37–95 (2010); Aaron-Andrew P. 
Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1401, 1410–18 (2010); 
Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1011–16 (2011).  
37 BINDER & SMITH, supra note 26, at 50–51. 
38 Barbara Sinclair, The “60-Vote Senate”: Strategies, Process, and Outcomes, in U.S. SENATE 
EXCEPTIONALISM 241, 241–46 (Bruce I. Oppenheimer ed., 2002). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
40 Id. § 7, cl. 2.  
41 Id. § 3, cl. 6 (conviction in impeachment trial); id. § 5, cl. 2 (expulsion); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
(treaties); id. art. V (amendments). 
42 Needless to say, the brief comments in the text hardly do justice to the constitutional debate.  
As I have acknowledged in prior work, the constitutionality of the filibuster (and the rules that protect it 
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2.  Evaluation from Pragmatic Premises 
So that is originalism.  Turning to more pragmatic considerations of 
policy consequences, the Senate is broken on this score as well.  Now, to 
be sure, one’s assessment here is strongly influenced by the politics of the 
moment and one’s substantive view of the merits of the particular 
legislation on the agenda.  Democrats like obstruction just fine when they 
are blocking Republican measures; Republicans like it when they can 
block Democratic measures.  Obviously we need to avoid that kind of 
reasoning when making a more principled assessment.   
Beyond the immediate party dynamics, one’s assessment of the 
filibuster might reflect a less directly partisan but still partly ideological 
stance concerning the general question of how easy it should be to 
legislate.  Again, our system is not designed to facilitate speedy 
lawmaking; the structure does not provide for a plebiscitary democracy in 
which present public desires are instantly transformed into public policy.  
The question here, however, is one of degree.  If one wants legislating to 
be more difficult—not just for certain laws or parties but across the board 
as a principled matter—then it might seem that adding hurdles like the 
filibuster would be desirable.  Such a sentiment might stem from a certain 
type of libertarian outlook according to which legislation is presumptively 
bad because it almost necessarily interferes with liberty, private property, 
and free markets.  (A compatible but distinct position, influenced by public 
choice theory, sees legislation as presumptively bad because it generally 
reflects special-interest deals rather than advancing the public interest.)  
Now, it may be that reformers simply have to concede that reining in 
the filibuster, even as a longer-term proposition that abstracts from current 
partisan aims, is not a win-win proposition that everyone could get behind 
regardless of their ideology.  Nonetheless, I believe that there should be 
rather few people who, upon reflection, actually have an interest in 
                                                                                                                          
from repeal) is a complicated question with many argumentative thrusts and parries but no knockout 
punches.  See Bruhl, supra note 36, at 1419–27 (summarizing the arguments).  For further elaboration 
of the argument that the contemporary filibuster rule is unconstitutional to the extent it cannot be 
changed by a majority, see Josh Chafetz’s contribution to this symposium, supra note 36, and 
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 245–52 (1997).  For a 
contrary view, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 
445, 450–62 (2004).  Note that the argument for unconstitutionality does not rely on a simplistic appeal 
to democracy.  First, democracy is a highly complicated and contested concept.  Second, our 
Constitution is not straightforwardly democratic in the majority-rule sense.  Third, to the extent that 
democracy ordinarily requires that popular majorities rule, popular majorities need not line up with 
Senate majorities.  That is, because of the Senate’s malapportionment with respect to population, a 
filibustering minority could represent many more people than the Senate majority.  This last fact might 
tempt one to mount a democratic case for the filibuster.  Nonetheless, it seems to me that a party that is 
strong enough to hold the presidency, the majority in the House, and the majority in the Senate has 
sufficiently proven its democratic pedigree that it should be permitted to govern.  Public opinion acts as 
a check as well.  Thus, we do not need the filibuster to prevent minority rule by an unrepresentative 
Senate majority. 
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retaining the filibuster.  
To begin with, to the extent the filibuster is thought to be valuable 
because it simply makes it harder to legislate and thus tends to entrench the 
status quo, the status quo is not the libertarian common-law baseline.  The 
status quo includes, among other things, government-run retirement 
financing (i.e., Social Security), Medicare, corporate income taxes, the war 
on drugs, agricultural subsidies, and, perhaps most immediately relevant, 
the recent healthcare reform act.  The filibuster makes it harder to repeal 
these programs, cut taxes, and accomplish the rest of a libertarian agenda, 
just as it makes it harder to create new programs.  Put differently, maybe 
obstruction can keep the government off your back, but obstruction will 
not get it off your back once it is there.     
Further, and contrary to the assumption in the previous paragraph, it is 
not necessarily the case that the effect of the filibuster is to block 
legislative action.  Sometimes the filibuster simply makes legislation more 
costly in the quite literal sense that the way to get the support of the last 
few necessary Senators (who are increasingly distant from a bill’s 
supporters) is not through persuasion or compromise on the merits but 
through the addition of special benefits desired by the pivotal Senators’ 
constituents and contributors.43  Here the healthcare reform act, with its 
“Cornhusker kickback” and “Louisiana Purchase,” is distinctive only 
because the deal-making was more visible.44  Libertarians and 
conservatives should be particularly averse to any parliamentary device 
that encourages such pork-barreling.   
Still further, it seems that just about everyone, regardless of ideology, 
has an interest in maintaining electoral accountability.  Elections should 
have consequences.  Whether the majority supports socialism on the one 
hand or social Darwinism on the other, today the minority can block the 
majority’s legislative program or at least shape it to the minority’s liking, 
even under conditions of unified government.  Who, then, should the 
public blame when the party that appears to be in power disappoints?  
                                                                                                                          
43 See Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution with Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 471, 486–87 (1999) (observing that “supermajority voting requirements may increase the 
amount of special interest legislation as lawmakers work to assemble larger coalitions”).  The same 
point applies to veto points more generally, including bicameralism.  Suppose the House wishes to 
spend money on Project A and the Senate wishes to spend money on Project B.  One outcome is that 
both measures fail, but another is that bicameral logrolling lets both succeed.  Cf. 1 RECORDS, supra 
note 28, at 486 (reporting Madison’s remark that small states could use their voting power in the Senate 
to “extort” measures, not just “obstruct” them).  For an examination of the complex dynamics of 
bicameralism and spending, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, Dysfunctional Congress?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 371, 
378–79 (2009). 
44 See Chris Frates, Payoffs for States Seal Senate Deal, POLITICO.COM (Dec. 19, 2009, 7:56 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30815.html (discussing special deals used to secure the 
votes of wavering Senators); see generally DIANA EVANS, GREASING THE WHEELS: USING PORK 
BARREL PROJECTS TO BUILD MAJORITY COALITIONS IN CONGRESS (2004) (discussing the role of 
particularized benefits in forging legislative coalitions). 
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True, we will never have the kind of responsible party government found 
in a parliamentary system.45  After all, ours is not a parliamentary system; 
it is a presidential system that can and frequently does experience divided 
government—factors that tend to blur the lines of accountability for policy 
outcomes.  Some degree of accountability is required, however, and the 
current state of affairs is not conducive to it.  The problem, as Jack Balkin 
has astutely observed, is that we now seem to be experiencing an unstable 
combination of presidential structure and parliamentary behavior.46  That 
is, the opposition party (the Republican Party in the 111th Congress) unites 
for the purpose of bringing down the government through constant 
opposition,47 yet the majority party lacks the power to enact—and be 
judged upon—its own preferred program even when it nominally controls 
all the legislative organs.  If the stimulus fails, who is the responsible 
party?  President Obama and the Democrats . . . or Senator Collins?   
Finally, legislative dysfunction creates the risk that the action simply 
moves elsewhere.  Decisions must be made, and action must be taken, 
especially as circumstances change and new problems arise.  The political 
system is like a hydraulic system: shut off a valve here and the pressure 
will exert itself through other channels.48  The policy choices will be made, 
just not through our elected legislators acting through the constitutionally 
envisioned channels.  A broken legislative process means a greater role for 
executive, administrative, and judicial lawmaking.   
These developments are already apparent.  When legislation stalls, the 
relevant agency interprets its existing authority more aggressively.49  
Measures that cannot overcome a filibuster might end up in an executive 
order.  Similar dynamics apply to presidential appointments that require 
Senate confirmation.  If the confirmations process is gridlocked, the 
                                                                                                                          
45 Essentially, the idea of responsible party government is that the parties present the voters with 
clearly contrasting programs and the party that wins the election is allowed to implement its program 
and is then judged on its performance at the next election.  See generally COMM. ON POL. PARTIES, AM. 
POL. SCI. ASS’N, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM (1950); AUSTIN RANNEY, THE 
DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATE (1954).  
46 Jack M. Balkin, Parliamentary Parties in a Presidential System, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 30, 
2010, 6:42 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/11/parliamentary-parties-in-presidential.html.  
47 See Peter Baker, Tide Turns, Starkly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A1 (reporting on 
Republican leader Mitch McConnell’s statement that “the single most important thing we want to 
achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president”); Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Senate 
Republican Leader Finds Weapon in Party Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A13 (describing 
McConnell’s strategy of holding his caucus together in order to “slow things down” and “deny 
Democrats any Republican support on big legislation”); see also Jonathan Chait, The GOP’s Secret 
Senate Plan, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 17, 2010, 6:55 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-
chait/80139/gop-secret-senate-plan-mcconnell (speculating that McConnell secured a pledge from all 
Republicans that they would vote together on procedural matters). 
48 Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (using the hydraulic metaphor to describe the role of money in 
political campaigns). 
49 See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold & Juliet Eilperin, EPA To Pick Up Climate Change Where 
Congress Left Off, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2010, at A3. 
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President can circumvent the constitutionally prescribed appointments 
process with more aggressive use of recess appointments50 and non-
confirmed White House czars.51  These developments hold risk for 
representative government. 
In sum, while complete neutrality may not be possible, it seems to me 
that just about everyone should regard the current situation—a routine 
supermajority rule in the Senate—as unattractive and untenable.  Why, 
then, does it prove so resistant to change? 
III.  IMPEDIMENTS TO FIXING THE SENATE 
I next turn to the topic of Senate reform, in particular the obstacles that 
impede it.  I do not take a position here on how exactly the Senate’s rules 
should be changed.  The choice of a particular decision procedure is a 
complicated question combining political science, political theory, and 
political morality.  Perhaps the best solution is simple majority rule without 
filibusters, on the model of the House of Representatives.  Or perhaps the 
ideal solution is a suspensive veto that would let the minority delay 
legislation but not block it.52  Quite possibly the rule should vary 
depending on the kind of measure at issue: substantive legislation, 
appropriations, judicial appointments, or executive appointments.53  My 
goal here is to explain why any move toward majoritarianism is difficult. 
Part of the difficulty of reforming the supermajoritarian Senate stems 
from the rules for changing the rules.  An amendment to the Senate’s 
rules—such as a reduction in the filibuster threshold or some other 
filibuster reform—is itself subject to filibuster.  In fact, it is even harder to 
invoke cloture on a motion to amend the rules—which requires a two-
thirds vote in favor—than it is to invoke cloture on ordinary legislation—
                                                                                                                          
50 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.”).  President Obama has made a number of recess appointments; some of the appointees 
had faced significant opposition, while others were delayed despite being noncontroversial.  Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Obama Bypasses Senate Process, Filling 15 Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1; Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, Six Recess Appointments To Be Made, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010, at A18.  
51 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 154–57 
(2010) (explaining how filibusters, holds, and delays encourage presidents to circumvent senatorial 
confirmation for top policy advisors); Brady Dennis, Warren Expected To Be Adviser, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 16, 2010, at A18 (reporting that Elizabeth Warren was selected to organize the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection as a presidential advisor rather than appointed director in order to avoid 
protracted confirmations process). 
52 See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2011) 
(proposing this reform).  
53 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster, the Median 
Senator, and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 261 (discussing the benefits 
of filibusters of Supreme Court appointments); Bruce Ackerman, Filibuster Reform Both Parties Can 
Agree On, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2011, at A15 (arguing for supermajority rules for judicial appointments 
but simple majorities for executive appointments). 
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which requires a “mere” three-fifths.54  And the rules also provide that they 
remain in force from Congress to Congress indefinitely, such that the 
filibuster rule is entrenched.55  Thus, at least according to the Senate rules, 
the majority cannot establish majority rule.  The difficulty of amending the 
rules through this process explains the occasional threatened recourse to 
the “nuclear” or “constitutional” option, according to which the majority 
would assert the power to set new rules free of the supermajoritarian 
features of the current rules.56  Such a maneuver would be extraordinary 
inasmuch as it would deviate from the Senate’s established rules and usual 
practices.  As I have explained at length elsewhere, I nonetheless believe 
such a procedure would be lawful because the Senate’s rules cannot validly 
entrench themselves in perpetuity against majoritarian change.57  Yet even 
those who condemn the filibuster hesitate to eliminate it through this route.   
Of course, not all Senators will agree with the legal proposition that the 
rules can be validly changed by a majority, and others will believe that the 
Senate was meant, as a historical matter, to operate by supermajority rules.  
I believe those views are mistaken, but they surely exist.  Further, some 
Senators no doubt genuinely believe that the body should be 
supermajoritarian in order to raise the difficulty of legislating, a reasonable 
view (though again one that I, with the support of high authority,58 reject). 
The deeper explanation for the absence of substantial reform, however, 
is perhaps not so much legal or philosophical as political.  It is a matter of 
Senators’ incentives.  Both sides, majority and minority, have reasons to 
favor supermajority rules.  The Senators in the minority have an obvious 
and immediate incentive to protect minority vetoes, so that they can block 
the other party’s initiatives or extract compromises or favors as the price of 
their support.  And the members in the majority, despite the immediate 
desire to get their way, are not so shortsighted as to overlook the fact that 
they will probably return to the minority sooner or later.  Apart from those 
party- and policy-oriented considerations that tend to impede reform, 
Senators also have an individualistic interest in preserving the filibuster 
because it likely increases the Senators’ power relative to other 
government officials and may increase the power of rank-and-file Senators 
                                                                                                                          
54 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 4, at 15 (Rule XXII.2).  The denominator for the 
two cloture votes differs.  For cloture on legislation, it is the whole Senate membership; for cloture on 
amending the rules, it is the number of Senators present and voting.  Id.  Still, given the stakes of a vote 
on changing the Senate’s rules, one would expect full or nearly full attendance. 
55 Id. at 4 (Rule V). 
56 See Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option To Change Senate Rules and 
Procedures: A Majoritarian Means To Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 
219–26, 232–69 (2004) (detailing a number of prior instances in which majoritarian change was 
threatened or employed). 
57 Bruhl, supra note 36, at 1410–18. 
58 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
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relative to the Senate leadership.59  I imagine that when a Senator puts a 
hold on several bills or nominations, legislative leaders and cabinet 
secretaries suddenly become much more eager to hear about the issue that 
is bothering the Senator at the moment.   
As recent events illustrate, political incentives have mostly favored the 
status quo.  At one time it appeared that the start of the 112th Congress in 
January 2011 might see major changes to the Senate’s rules.  Over the 
course of the previous year, the Senate had held a series of hearings on the 
history, legality, and consequences of the filibuster and related practices 
like holds.60  Several Senators introduced reform proposals, some of which 
were quite ambitious in that they attempted to move the Senate in the 
direction of majority rule.61  In December 2010, shortly before the new 
Congress convened, every returning Democratic Senator signed a letter 
endorsing reform.62   
Yet when the actual reform package was unveiled, it was quite mild.  
Most notably, it did not contemplate lowering the sixty-vote cloture 
threshold.  Instead, it proposed five changes to current practice.63  First, it 
would eliminate filibusters on the motion to proceed, a motion that the 
Senate uses to bring a matter up for debate.  This reform would reduce the 
number of distinct filibusters to which a particular measure could be 
subjected.  Second, the reform package provided that post-cloture debate—
that is, the amount of debate permitted even after cloture is invoked—
would be reduced from thirty hours to two hours for nominations (though 
not for legislation).  Third, the package would eliminate anonymous holds.  
Holds by individual Senators would still be allowed, but the responsible 
Senator would have to own up to the delay.  Fourth, it would attempt to 
ensure that more filibusters were actual talking filibusters.  (Today, most 
filibusters do not include extended debate; instead, a Senator “filibusters” a 
measure merely by threatening to engage in time-consuming debate, which 
is usually sufficient to persuade the majority to abandon the measure and 
                                                                                                                          
59 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 90, 140 (1989) 
(explaining that changes in the political landscape have increased incentives to engage in filibustering 
and other individualistic behavior); GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: 
OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 263 (2006) (explaining that “bids to eliminate 
the filibuster in the contemporary Senate run up against individual senators’ personal power goals”). 
60 Examining the Filibuster: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Administration, 111th 
Cong. 111–706 (2010) (printing materials from six hearings held during 2010). 
61 E.g., S. Res. 416, 111th Cong. (2010) (resolution introduced by Sen. Harkin, which would 
eventually permit majority cloture after a series of cloture votes); S. Res. 396, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(resolution introduced by Sen. Udall, which asserted the right to adopt new rules at the start of the next 
Congress by majority vote). 
62 Dan Friedman, Senate’s Returning Democrats Unanimously Favor Filibuster Reform, NAT’L J., 
Dec. 22, 2010, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/senate-s-returning-democrats-
unanimously-favor-filibuster-reform-20101222. 
63 The remainder of this paragraph describes the proposals contained in S. Res. 10, 112th Cong. 
(2011), which was introduced by Sen. Tom Udall on January 5, 2011. 
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use its valuable time on other priorities.)  Fifth, in order to accommodate 
the minority’s complaints that it is forced to obstruct because the majority 
will not allow it to offer amendments,64 the package guarantees the 
minority leader the right to offer three germane amendments. 
As noted, these proposed changes were modest, at least compared to 
lowering the cloture threshold.  Potentially the most important was the 
attempt to return to a system in which filibustering Senators must actually 
hold the floor.  The proposal provided that filibustering Senators must 
actually engage in debate and cannot ask for a quorum call or make 
dilatory motions.65  If no Senator is willing to continue the debate, cloture 
would be invoked notwithstanding the previous failure of a cloture vote.66  
This would tend to shift a greater burden onto the filibustering Senators 
and raise the costs of obstruction.  Such a change could be important 
because, as with most things, when the price goes up, the quantity 
purchased goes down.  Indeed, several political scientists have contended 
that filibusters have increased so much in recent decades because the cost 
of filibustering has dropped so far that the minority can almost always 
outlast the majority.67  If obstruction became more taxing, the majority 
would more often be able to win wars of attrition.  
This reform package failed.  It became apparent that support for major 
reforms was weak even within the Democratic caucus, such that the most 
committed reformers lacked even the fifty-one votes needed to proceed 
under the constitutional or nuclear option, let alone the supermajority 
required under the current rules.68  The ultimate result of all the agitation 
for reform was a deal, worked out by leaders in both parties, that involved 
a few relatively minor changes to the Senate’s practices.69  Pursuant to the 
agreement, the Senate overwhelmingly voted to restrain the use of 
anonymous holds by heightening the disclosure requirements.70  It also 
voted to restrict the minority’s ability to delay through forcing the oral 
reading of amendments.71  Apart from those formal resolutions, the 
Democratic and Republican leaders also publicly committed to the 
following: neither side would seek to use the nuclear or constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
64 E.g., Susan M. Collins, Congress Got Nasty. Here’s How To Fix It, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 
2010, at B4 (stating that Republicans “overuse the filibuster, because our only option is to stop a bill to 
which we cannot offer amendments”). 
65 S. Res. 10, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., KOGER, supra note 36, at 197–99; WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 59, at 30–31, 
259–64. 
68 See Paul Kane, Senate Nears Approval of Filibuster Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2011, at 
A03 (describing opposition from Republicans as well as senior Democrats to more sweeping reform 
proposals). 
69 Carl Hulse, Senate Approves Changes Intended To Ease Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, 
at A20. 
70 S. Res. 28, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
71 S. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
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option to change the rules by majority vote in the 112th or the 113th 
Congress, both parties would work together to pass legislation exempting 
many lower-level executive appointments from the requirement of 
senatorial confirmation, and the minority would reduce filibustering on the 
motion to proceed in exchange for the majority leader’s promise to allow 
the minority to offer amendments.72   
It is still too early to assess the full significance of the changes that 
have been implemented and promised.  Nonetheless, at the most they will 
amount to rather minor improvements.  
IV.  CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE REFORM 
The Senate’s supermajoritarian voting rules render it dysfunctional.  
There is no legal impediment to change.  Yet significant reform seems out 
of reach, in substantial part due to Senators’ private incentives.  
Is there any way to heighten the prospects of meaningful reform by 
altering those incentives?  Probably so, and in closing I will mention two 
approaches: veiling partisanship and harnessing partisanship. 
The essence of the veiling strategy is to render the immediate winners 
and losers of reform uncertain.73  This could be done, for example, by 
delaying the effective date of any reform for several years, so that we 
would not know which party would hold the White House and the Senate 
when the new rules (whatever they happen to be) came into effect.  One 
benefit of veiling is that it can reduce opposition that is based on 
immediate partisan calculations.  Another benefit, of a different type, is 
that veiling can also reduce support for reform that is based on immediate 
partisan calculations.  This is beneficial because it lends legitimacy to 
reform efforts.  A related way to increase the legitimacy of Senate reform 
is to do it when the stakes of reform are lower, such as when the House of 
Representatives and the presidency are already divided.  This is of course 
the situation in the 112th Congress.  In such an alignment, the filibuster is 
not such an important hurdle, at least when it comes to legislation rather 
than appointments.  
Another route to reform is quite the opposite of veiling.  It is to 
positively harness the majority’s immediate partisan imperatives to enact 
its agenda.  One of the shortcomings of veiling is that it does not do 
anything to persuade those Senators who on sober reflection sincerely 
believe that the Senate should be supermajoritarian no matter who is in the 
majority.  Nor does pushing off reform until after the next election 
                                                                                                                          
72 This agreement was memorialized in a colloquy between Senators Reid and McConnell on the 
Senate floor.  157 CONG. REC. S324–25 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011). 
73 See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 399, 
403–04 (2001) (describing how veiling strategies attempt to suppress self-interested decisions by 
restricting information). 
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diminish Senators’ individualistic incentives to retain a device that makes 
them individually more powerful regardless of whether they find 
themselves in the majority or the minority after the next election.  But one 
imagines that at some point the immediate partisan need to enact one’s 
program overcomes the contrary considerations just mentioned.  This is a 
less desirable scenario for reform from a good-government perspective, but 
it is no less efficacious.  If obstruction continues to become more potent, at 
some point the conditions for partisan-driven reform will materialize.  The 
circumstances of such reform will be a cause for regret, but the long-term 
benefit of a more majoritarian Senate may be worth it if there is no 
alternative. 
 
